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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professional and collegiate sports are colossal money-making 
industries in the United States consisting of ticket sales, concessions, 
television deals, internet subscriptions, merchandise and much more.  
Sports wagering, however, may be the one aspect of sports that is 
bigger than the games themselves.  An estimated $4 billion is wagered 
annually in Las Vegas alone, in addition to an estimated $80 billion to 
$380 billion that is wagered annually through illegal channels.1  
Allowing sports wagering to remain illegal nationally and continuing 
to have people bet on sports unlawfully is leaving billions of dollars 
untaxed and unregulated each year.  In the past fifty years, the United 
States has experienced a substantial expansion in legalized gambling, 
with sports wagering being the only major holdout.2 
The barrier that stands in the way of legalized sports wagering is 
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which 
is a 1992 federal statute that makes wagering on professional and 
amateur sports unlawful, except for in a few states that were 
grandfathered into the statute.3  At the forefront of the legalization 
battle is the state of New Jersey, whose voters have approved sports 
wagering through a referendum and a state that could desperately use 
the revenue it in order to boost its gambling-fueled economy, but 
cannot implement it into its casinos and racetracks because of PASPA.4 
The fight has been raging on in courts for years now in NCAA v. 
Christie, a series of Third Circuit cases where the professional and 
amateur sports leagues (the “Leagues”) challenged New Jersey’s 
implementation of legalized sports wagering, arguing that the State’s 
acts violated PASPA.5   In 2013, the Third Circuit first held that PASPA 
was constitutional and that New Jersey’s attempt to legalize sports 
wagering violated PASPA.6  After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
New Jersey’s second attempt to legalize sports wagering was once 
                                                                                                                         
 1 Will Hobson, Sports gambling in U.S.: Too prevalent to remain illegal?, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/sports-
gambling-in-us-too-prevalent-to-remain-illegal/2015/02/27/f1088e4c-b7d3-11e4-9423-f3
d0a1ec335c_story.html?utm_term=.ece1e446a9fe. 
 2 Id. 
 3 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. (2015). 
 4 MaryAnn Spoto, Sports betting backed by N.J. voters, NJ.COM (Nov. 8, 2011, 10:10 
PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/nj_residents_vote_on_legalizin.html. 
 5 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3rd 
Cir. 2016). 
 6 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 240 (holding that nothing in PASPA violates the United States 
Constitution). 
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again struck down by the Third Circuit, with the dissenting judge in the 
first case writing the majority opinion of the second case.7  In late 2015, 
an obviously split Third Circuit decided to vacate all of the previous 
opinions, and hear the case again en banc.8  In August 2016, the Third 
Circuit once again affirmed the principles that the court had previously 
set forth, and held that PASPA is constitutional and that New Jersey’s 
attempt to legalize sports wagering clearly violated the statute.9 
The hypocrisy of the PASPA protections comes in the form of 
fantasy sports.  These games allow people to create their own teams 
based on the players they believe will perform the best during games.  
Fantasy sports are legal because they are not gambling under the 
Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act, which classifies 
fantasy sports as legal skill betting, instead of illegal chance betting.10  
Although some attorney generals in New York, Illinois and, most 
recently, Texas are beginning to challenge the legality of fantasy sports 
as lawful forms of gambling, these games continue to operate in most 
states.11 
PASPA is causing economic harm to New Jersey and other states 
that can benefit from sports wagering, as these states are missing out 
on large increases in gambling revenue.  Since the Third Circuit has 
ruled three times on sports wagering, it is now an issue that the 
Supreme Court should decide.  PASPA is unconstitutional because it 
violates core concepts of federalism, and is barring New Jersey from 
implementing sports wagering, even though the voters have approved 
it. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. New Jersey’s Gambling History 
New Jersey has a long history of gambling spanning back to the 
American Revolution, and it has played a pivotal role in New Jersey’s 
                                                                                                                         
 7 NCAA, 799 F.3d at 268 (holding that New Jersey’s law violates PASPA because it 
authorizes sports gambling by law). 
 8 NCAA v. Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015). 
 9 NCAA, 832 F.3d at 402 (holding that New Jersey’s law violates PASPA because it 
authorizes by law sports gambling, and PASPA remains constitutional). 
 10 Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act, 152 Cong Rec H 4978 
§ 101(3)(D)(ix)(II) (2006). 
 11 Jacob Pramuk, DraftKings, FanDuel lobby Congress amid legal challenges, CNBC 
(Jan. 21, 2016 1:24 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/21/draftkings-fanduel-lobby-
congress-amid-legal-challenges.html. 
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economy ever since.12  During the colonial era, New Jersey’s culture 
was much more permissive of gambling than other colonies, using 
lotteries to raise money for military supplies, civic projects, and the 
construction of what is now Rutgers University.13  In the 1830s, horse 
racing began to grow in popularity and became a vital part of New 
Jersey’s gambling-funded economy.14  Horse racing continues to 
remain popular today, as New Jersey currently operates three 
racetracks and multiple off-track betting centers.15  Additionally, state-
sponsored lotteries operate throughout New Jersey, and are available at 
convenience stores, liquor stores, supermarkets, and pharmacies 
throughout the State.16  New Jersey does put part of lottery proceeds to 
good use, as thirty percent of all unclaimed lottery winnings are 
allocated to State institutions and State aid for education.17 
In 1974, New Jersey voters first saw, and defeated, casino 
gambling on a ballot.18  Then in 1976, a revised referendum was 
approved, by a slim margin, that limited gambling to the confines of 
the popular shore town, Atlantic City, New Jersey.19  In 1978, Atlantic 
City opened Resorts International, its first hotel and casino, and 
gambling instantly proved to be a success by surpassing Las Vegas as 
the gambling capital of the United States for a period of time.20  Atlantic 
City’s beautiful beaches combined with casino gambling, world-class 
hotels and entertainment led the City to instantly become a New Jersey 
Shore landmark. 
Atlantic City experienced a few decades of prosperity, but as time 
went on, several factors led to the City’s recent demise, including, the 
revitalization of Las Vegas; luxury casinos in Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and New York; outdated Atlantic City hotels and 
casinos; failure to rejuvenate the City’s residential community; and 
online gambling. In March 2016, Atlantic City’s failing casinos and 
housing crisis caused New Jersey to consider a state-takeover of the 
                                                                                                                         
 12 New Jersey gambling: A historical snapshot, NJ GAMBLING WEBSITES, 
http://www.njgamblingwebsites.com/new-jersey-gambling-history/ (last visited Oct. 16, 
2016). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 N.J.S.A. 5:9-17. 
 18 History of Casino Gambling in Atlantic City, ATLANTIC CITY FREE PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
http://www.acfpl.org/ac-history-menu/atlantic-city-heritage-collections/15-heston-
archives/68-history-of-casino-gambling-in-atlantic-city (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
 19 Id. 
 20 New Jersey gambling: A historical snapshot, supra note 12. 
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City, which would shut down all nonessential government services.21  
Still with all of its issues, Atlantic City’s five casinos generated over 
$2.6 million in taxes during July 2016 alone.22  Sports wagering could 
help generate even more in taxes payable to New Jersey, bring visitors 
back into Atlantic City, and give the City the boost it so desperately 
needs in order to bring it back to its glory days. 
B. Sports Wagering in the United States and the Rise of Fantasy 
Sports 
Sports wagering is growing at an exceptionally fast rate, and most 
of it goes untaxed and unregulated.23  Nearly $4 billion is bet on sports 
each year in Las Vegas, while an estimated $80 billion to $380 billion 
is wagered illegally, through offshore online betting houses, office 
pools, and neighborhood bookmakers.24  This means that billions of 
dollars go unregulated and untaxed on sports wagering alone each year.  
In the past fifty years, the gambling industry in the United States has 
expanded vastly with the evolution of lotteries, casino gambling, and 
online gambling: with the only holdout being sports wagering.25 
One of the motivating factors for originally banning sports 
wagering was to protect the integrity of highly-profitable professional 
and amateur sports, mostly due to the negative stigma attached to 
gambling.26  Over time, however, a different, less-negative viewpoint 
on sports gambling has arose.27  Sports announcers give their picks for 
who is going to win each game, President Obama has been filling out 
a National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) tournament 
bracket each year, and major newspapers and sports websites offer up-
                                                                                                                         
 21 Joel Rose, Atlantic City Faces Financial Collapse, Cringes At State Takeover, NPR 
(Mar. 24, 2016, 9:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/23/471618590/atlantic-city-faces-
financial-collapse-cringes-at-state-takeover. 
 22 New Jersey Online Gambling Revenue, PLAY NJ, https://www.playnj.com/new-
jersey/revenue/ (last updated Dec. 2016). 
 23 Hobson, supra note 1. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 216 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d 
389 (3rd Cir. 2016) (citing S. REP. No. 102-248, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3556, noting the Committee’s concern that “[w]idespread legalization 
of sports gambling would inevitably promote suspicion about controversial plays and lead 
fans to think ‘the fix was in’ whenever their team failed to beat the point-spread”). 
 27 Tim Dahlberg, Column: Time to do away with sports betting stigma, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2012, 6:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-
wires/20120526/tim-dahlberg-052612/. 
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to-the-minute betting lines.28  Due to the fact that sports wagering has 
become more prevalent, it has also become more mainstream and 
accepted. 
Particularly in the past few years, fantasy sports have taken the 
spotlight, especially daily and weekly fantasy sports, where players can 
change their team accordingly, considering injuries and poor 
performances.  As of August 2015, 56.8 million people in the United 
States and Canada had already played fantasy sports in 2015 alone.29  
This was before football, the most popular fantasy sport, even began its 
season.30  Additionally, the number of participants had already 
exceeded the more than the 41 million people that had played the entire 
previous year.31  Fans now find themselves not only being loyal to their 
favorite teams, but also cheering for other teams or individual plays 
that will benefit their own fantasy teams each week.32  In 2015 alone, 
daily fantasy sports were expected to generate around $2.6 billion in 
entry fees, mostly from two main websites, FanDuel and DraftKings.33  
These websites allow participants to enter various fantasy games 
ranging in size and wager amount.34  The websites allow participants 
to enter into new games with new teams every week, instead of being 
stuck with the same season-long fantasy teams.  This allows players to 
enter different games and place different wagers every day. 
The legality of online, daily fantasy sports is a highly debated 
issue.  In 2006, Congress enacted the Internet Gambling Protection and 
Enforcement Act (the Act), based on findings that Internet gambling is 
primarily funded through payment system instruments, credit cards, 
and wire transfers, leading to growing debt collection problems.35  The 
Act prohibits placing “bets and wagers” online, unless individual states 
allow it.  The Act describes “bets and wagers” as the “staking or risking 
by any person of something of value upon the outcome of a contest of 
others, a sporting event, or a game predominantly subject to chance, 
upon an agreement or understanding that the person or another person 
                                                                                                                         
 28 See Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting The Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 589 (2013). 
 29 John Affleck, What’s behind fantasy football’s surprising popularity, FORTUNE 
(Sep.12, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/12/fantasy-football-growth/. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Timothy Fong, Daily Fantasy Sports Are Clearly Gambling, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD 
REPORT (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:00AM), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/are-daily-fantasy-
sports-gambling/daily-fantasy-sports-games-are-clearly-gambling. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act, 152 Cong Rec H 4978 § 2 ch. 
4(a)(1), (3). 
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will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome.”36  
The Act carves out fantasy sports as an exception, because the winning 
outcomes reflect the knowledge and skill of the participants.37 
Congress takes issue with people placing bets online, and ratified 
this Act because of the easy access to the Internet, and the easy access 
to obtain money that people cannot afford to lose. At the same time, 
however, Congress distinguishes between games of chance, like 
roulette, blackjack, and poker, which are illegal online, and games of 
skill, like fantasy sports, which are legal.38  In doing so, Congress 
declared that participating in online fantasy sports is not illegal 
gambling because it does not require the staking or risking of money 
subject to chance, but rather subject to skill.  Therefore, partaking in 
online fantasy sports is legal gambling. 39 
To determine whether a game is classified as a game of chance or 
skill, courts look to the dominant factor in determining the outcome of 
the game.40  Although courts disagree about whether games like poker 
and backgammon are chance or skill, there is no doubt that players need 
to understand the game and know how to handle certain situations.41  
There is still, however, an incredible amount of chance involved in 
proving the player’s success.42  This same analysis can be applied to 
fantasy sports, as there is skill involved in picking players and knowing 
individual matchups for the game, but then there is still an enormous 
amount of chance involved in determining the outcome, like player 
performance, physical and emotional health, injuries, weather, and 
substitutions.  For example, in football, a certain running-back may 
seem like a great pick for a game, but if the other team comes out and 
scores three touchdowns in the first quarter, the running back may not 
see much of the ball for the rest of the game because the team may 
                                                                                                                         
 36 Id. § 101(3)(6)(A). 
 37 Id. § 101(3)(D)(ix)(II) (2006) (“participation in any fantasy or simulation sports 
game or educational game or contest in which (if the game or contest involves a team or 
teams) no fantasy or simulation sports team is based on the current membership of an actual 
team that is a member of an amateur or professional sports organization (as those terms are 
defined in section 3701 of title 28) and that meets the following conditions: . . . (II)  All 
winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the participants and are 
determined predominantly by accumulated statistical results of the performance of 
individuals (athletes in the case of sports events) in multiple real-world sporting or other 
events.”). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Michael Trippiedi, Note, Daily Fantasy Sports Leagues: Do You Have The Skill to 
Win at These Games of Chance?, 5 UNLV GAMING L.J. 201, 215 (2014). 
 41 Id. at 216. 
 42 Id. 
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favor passing over running to score points faster.  The same ratio of 
skill to chance is prevalent in daily fantasy sports as in most casino 
table games, and none of these games should be classified as having 
chance or skill as the dominant factor. 
FanDuel and DraftKings contend that fantasy sports are legal 
because they are games of skill.43  A few states, however, believe that 
fantasy sports are gambling and either have acted, or are considering 
acting.  For example, Arizona, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana and 
Washington have long had prohibitions on fantasy sports.44  In the last 
few months of 2015, Nevada and New York took similar stances on the 
issue, declaring fantasy sports illegal gambling and sending cease-and-
desist letters to both DraftKings and FanDuel.45  On the other hand, 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Georgia and New Jersey have not taken 
any action yet, but have considered enacting their own rules.46  New 
Jersey for example, would much rather see fantasy sports regulated 
under state rules than have them completely shut down.47  Although 
some states have banned or want to ban daily fantasy sports, they 
remain legal in most of the country. 
Although the Leagues remain vehemently opposed to state-
sponsored sports wagering, the Leagues not only approve daily fantasy 
sports, but also have no problem taking a piece of the gold mine for 
themselves.48  The National Football League  (NFL) has allowed teams 
to sign multi-year deals with fantasy sports providers, leading the way 
for fifteen teams to sign deals including “stadium signage, radio and 
digital advertising and other promotions in exchange for an undisclosed 
amount.”49  The Major League Baseball (MLB) recently expanded its 
exclusive partnership with DraftKings and “has emblazoned its logo 
throughout several stadiums this season, including behind home plate 
                                                                                                                         
 43 Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act, 152 Cong Rec H 4978 
§ 101(3)(D)(ix)(II) (2006). 
 44 David Purdum & Darren Rovell, N.Y. AG declares DraftKings, FanDuel are illegal 
gambling, not fantasy, ESPN (Nov. 11, 2015), http://espn.go.com/chalk
/story/_/id/14100780/new-york-attorney-general-declares-daily-fantasy-sports-gambling. 
 45 See Id. 
 46 Wayne Perry, New Jersey lawmaker seeks to regulate daily fantasy sports, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 3, 2015, 2:32 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1cbad9eb
f5ba480d88003fea30db5631/new-jersey-lawmaker-seeks-regulate-daily-fantasy-sports-0. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Brent Schrotenboer, FanDuel signs deals with 15 NFL teams, escalating daily 
fantasy integration, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2015, 10:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/sports/2015/04/21/daily-fantasy-sports-fanduel-draftkings-nfl-mlb-nhl-
nba/26149961/. 
 49 Id. 
2016] The House Advantage 87 
and on the centerfield wall.”50  The National Hockey League (NHL) 
also signed on with DraftKings, making it the official fantasy game of 
the NHL, allowing the site to use all of its intellectual property.51  
Finally, not only do thirteen National Basketball Association (NBA) 
teams have partnerships with FanDuel, but the NBA itself signed a 
contract with the site, including an equity stake in the site.52  It is a 
hypocrisy that the Leagues are battling with New Jersey to stop sports 
wagering in order to protect the integrity of their games, yet they are 
financially intertwined with daily fantasy sports. 
The popularity of sports gambling has been mounting over time 
and only seems to be growing with the advancement of the Internet.  As 
fantasy sports continue to gain popularity, it appears the negative 
characteristics associated with illegal gambling are beginning to wear 
off.53  Fantasy sports do not carry the typical negative stigmas of 
gambling like decreased economic productivity, increased crime, and 
the erosion of morality that illegal gambling still carries.  Instead, 
fantasy sports betting lead to an increase in the health of the economy.54  
It is very possible that the same could happen to sports wagering, 
should it become nationally legal, which could possibly lead to a 
stimulation in the economy similar to the effect of daily fantasy sports. 
C. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
Enacted in 1992, PASPA makes it unlawful for a governmental 
entity or person to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or 
authorize by law or compact, 
a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or 
wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the 
use of geographical references or otherwise), on one or more 
competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes 
participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more 
performances of such athletes in such games.55 
                                                                                                                         
 50 Id. 
 51 Darren Heitner, NHL Does Multi-Year Exclusive Deal with DraftKings, FORBES 
(Nov. 10, 2014, 7:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2014/11/10/nhl-
does-multi-year-exclusive-deal-with-draftkings/. 
 52 Darren Heitner, FanDuel Signs Multi-Year Partnerships With 13 NBA Teams, 
FORBES (Jun. 23, 2015, 8:54 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner
/2015/06/23/fanduel-signs-multi-year-partnerships-with-13-nba-teams/. 
 53 Nathaniel J. Ehrman, Article, Out of Bounds?: A Legal Analysis of Pay-To-Play 
Daily Fantasy Sports, 22 SPORTS L.J. 79, 114 (2015). 
 54 See generally id. at 108–12. 
 55 28 U.S.C.S. § 3702 (2015). 
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PASPA does not apply to some states that were exempted from 
the statute.56  In order to qualify for the exception, states had to have at 
least a ten-year history with licensed gambling, and states that met that 
stipulation only had one year to apply to be grandfathered in under the 
legislation.57 Nevada, Oregon, and Delaware were the only states that 
applied and were exempted from PASPA.58  At the time of PASPA’s 
enactment, an exemption was carved out for New Jersey, but only if 
New Jersey enacted a sports gambling scheme within one year of 
PASPA’s enactment.59 New Jersey did not do so, and, therefore, the 
PASPA exemption expired and New Jersey remained barred from 
implementing sports wagering.60 
Looking to the statute’s legislative history, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee noted the problems arising from sports wagering, 
highlighting its concern for the integrity of sports, and that widespread 
legalization of gambling would promote suspicion about controversial 
plays and lead fans to think that games are fixed.61  The Senate Report 
characterized sports wagering as a national problem because “the moral 
erosion it produces cannot be limited geographically,” and “because 
once a state legalizes sports wagering, it will be extremely difficult for 
other states to resist the lure.”62  Moreover, the Senate Report stated 
“its concurrence with the then-director of New Jersey’s Division of 
Gambling Enforcement’s statement that ‘most law enforcement 
professionals agree that legalization has a negligible impact on, and in 
some ways enhances, illegal markets.’”63 
D. Past PASPA Challenges 
PASPA remained untouched for nearly two decades before it was 
challenged.  In recent years, the sports gambling industry has boomed 
and states want to take advantage of the positive economic impact that 
sports wagering can bring in the form of increased revenue. 
                                                                                                                         
 56 Id. § 3704. 
 57 What is PASPA? – Professional & Amateur Sports Protection Act Of 1992, 
LEGALGAMBLINGUSA.COM, http://www.legalgamblingusa.com/articles/what-is-paspa
.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
 58 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259, 261 (3d. Cir. 2015), vacated by NCAA 
v. Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 216 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d 389 
(3rd Cir. 2016). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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In 2009, PASPA was first challenged in the Third Circuit case, 
Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, where Delaware proposed 
allowing three types of sports gambling in the State, including multi-
game (parlay) betting.64  In 1977, this type of parlay betting had already 
been upheld in Delaware because it was confined to just NFL games, 
and because it involved three types of sports games, making chance the 
dominating factor.65   Here, Delaware argued that because it had 
implemented a similar betting scheme in the past and because Delaware 
was grandfathered into PASPA, it could then allow the new sports 
gambling proposals.66  The Third Circuit held that Delaware could 
adopt the new gambling schemes because Delaware was grandfathered 
into PASPA, and the proposed gambling scheme was very similar to 
the one upheld in 1976.67  Although the Third Circuit upheld 
Delaware’s sports gambling scheme, it provided a blow for other states 
hoping to legalize sports gambling, as the Third Circuit also upheld 
PASPA’s grandfathering clause, continuing to only allow sports 
gambling schemes that had been enacted in the past as the only 
exceptions to PASPA.68 
In 2011, the constitutionality of PASPA was challenged in 
Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder.  There, a New 
Jersey non-profit corporation, which disseminated electronic gaming 
information via the Internet, alleged that PASPA violated various 
provisions of the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause, the 
First Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, 
the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.69  The United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the non-
profit corporation’s claim for lack of standing, therefore, not 
addressing PASPA’s constitutionality claims.70 
The Third Circuit is the only Circuit Court to ever hear a PASPA 
challenge, or a case involving sports wagering.  The United States 
Supreme Court has never heard any case regarding PASPA’s 
constitutionality or sports wagering. 
                                                                                                                         
 64 Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 295 (3d. Cir. 2009), 
cert denied, 559 U.S. 1106 (2010). 
 65 Id. at 296. 
 66 Id. at 297. 
 67 Id. at 304 (holding that “under federal law, Delaware may, however, institute multi-
game (parlay) betting on at least three NFL games, because such betting is consistent with 
the scheme to the extent it was conducted in 1976”). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23383, 
at *2–5 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011). 
 70 Id. at *32 (granting the government’s motion and dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint 
for lack of standing). 
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E. The Sports Wagering Battle in New Jersey 
Prior to 2011, New Jersey was against sports wagering, as the 
New Jersey Constitution prohibited it, which may be the reason why 
New Jersey did not take advantage of PASPA’s exemption within the 
one-year window.71  However, the views of New Jersey voters have 
changed in the two decades since PASPA’s enactment.72  In 2011, a 
New Jersey referendum was held to legalize sports wagering and it was 
approved by the voters.73  When asked about the referendum, Senator 
Raymond Lesniak, who was a sports wagering advocate, said, “[i]t was 
a bigger win than we expected. There’s a strong movement to fight the 
federal ban in New Jersey.”74  New Jersey legislators were in favor of 
legalizing sports wagering, and with the approval of the referendum, 
voters were also onboard with legalizing sports wagering.75 
In response to the referendum, the New Jersey Constitution was 
amended, stating in relevant part: 
It shall also be lawful for the Legislature to authorize by law 
wagering at casinos or gambling houses in Atlantic City on 
the results of any professional, college, or amateur sport or 
athletic event, except that wagering shall not be permitted on 
a college sport or athletic event that takes place in New 
Jersey or on a sport or athletic event in which any New Jersey 
college team participates regardless of where the event takes 
place.76 
Voters approved the constitutional amendment, and legislators 
subsequently enacted the sports wagering law.77  This new law 
established a comprehensive regulatory scheme, license requirement 
for operators, extensive documentation, minimum cash reserves, and 
access to security and surveillance systems.78 
Following the enactment of the New Jersey Sports Wagering Law, 
the Leagues, which include the NBA, MLB, NCAA, NFL, and NHL, 
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brought an action against New Jersey Governor Chris Christie 
challenging PASPA’s constitutionality and seeking an injunction 
(“Christie I”).79  The United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey upheld PASPA’s constitutionality, and found that the 
Leagues were entitled to summary judgment and a permanent 
injunction.80  The case was subsequently appealed to the Third 
Circuit.81 
First in Christie I, the Third Circuit examined whether the 
Leagues had standing to bring the suit.82  Focusing mostly on whether 
the Leagues had suffered an “injury-in-fact,” the Leagues argued that 
they did have standing because their games were the New Jersey law’s 
central focus, and that the increase in sports gambling would put the 
integrity of their games at risk.83  The Third Circuit held that 
reputational harm is a cognizable injury-in-fact and that the enactment 
of the law created increased incentives for game-rigging.84  Therefore, 
the Third Circuit held that the Leagues did in fact have standing.85 
After holding that the Leagues had standing, the Third Circuit 
examined PASPA’s constitutionality.  First, the Third Circuit looked at 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.86  Acknowledging that 
this power is broad, the court found that both gambling and the 
Leagues’ contests (whether considered together or separately) affect 
interstate commerce.87  Also, even though New Jersey’s gambling 
activities may be purely intrastate themselves, they “substantially 
affect interstate commerce given the reach of gambling, sports, and 
sports wagering” across state lines.88  The court concluded that 
Congress can regulate sports wagering under the Commerce Clause.89 
Next, the court turned to whether PASPA commandeered the 
states.  New Jersey argued that “PASPA’s operation over their own 
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state law violated the anti-commandeering principle, which bars 
Congress from conscripting the states into doing the work of federal 
officials.”90  The court rejected New Jersey’s argument, and found that 
the principles New Jersey cited may abstractly be used to support their 
position, and accepting their position would result in “an undue 
expansion of the anti-commandeering doctrine.”91  The court also 
placed heavy weight on the fact that the previous statutes that it struck 
down under the anti-commandeering principle were affirmative 
commands to the states, and nothing like PASPA.92  PASPA operates 
as a law of pre-emption, which is constitutional under the Supremacy 
Clause.93 
Finally, the court analyzed whether PASPA violated equal 
sovereignty to the states by allowing the grandfathered states to 
continue operating sports wagering schemes while other states, like 
New Jersey cannot. The court struck down the equal sovereignty issue, 
explaining, “[t]hat [since] New Jersey seeks Nevada’s preferential 
treatment, and not a complete ban on the preferences, [it] undermines 
[New Jersey’s] invocation of the equal sovereignty doctrine.”94  Also, 
the court explained that New Jersey did not cite a case where the 
grandfathering rationale was used to justify a violation of equal 
sovereignty, which was most likely because “only two Supreme Court 
cases in modern times have applied the equal sovereignty principle.”95 
In Christie I, the Third Circuit ultimately held that nothing in 
PASPA violated the Constitution, as the statute neither exceeded 
Congress’s enumerated powers nor violated any principles of 
federalism.96  After the Third Circuit ruled in favor of the Leagues, New 
Jersey appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but certiorari was 
denied.97 
Seemingly unfazed by Christie I, New Jersey’s legislature passed 
a new law in 2014 which states in relevant part: 
[A]ny rules and regulations that may require or authorize any 
State agency to license, authorize, permit or otherwise take 
action to allow any person to engage in the placement or 
acceptance of any wager on any professional, collegiate, or 
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amateur sport contest or athletic event, or that prohibit 
participation in or operation of a pool that accepts such 
wagers, are repealed.98 
This new law permitted New Jersey casinos and racetracks to 
allow sports betting without state regulation and licensing.99  Governor 
Christie explained that he signed the bill into law because it adhered to 
PASPA, responded to the issues of the federal courts, and specified that 
no one under the age of twenty-one could bet, and that bets were not 
allowed to be placed on games involving New Jersey teams, or events 
in New Jersey.100 
The enactment of the 2014 Law led the Leagues to bring about a 
second case challenging the Law under PASPA (“Christie II”).101  As 
it did in Christie I, the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey once again granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Leagues and issued a permanent injunction against New Jersey.102  
New Jersey subsequently appealed to the Third Circuit for a second 
time.103 
In 2015, the Third Circuit once again struck down New Jersey’s 
attempt to legalize sports wagering in Christie II.104  The court reasoned 
that: (1) although the 2014 Law allowed sports wagering at casinos and 
racetracks, conduct of the sort is completely prohibited by PASPA; (2) 
although the 2014 Law is labeled as a repealer, it is actually an 
authorization; and (3) the court “will not read statutory provisions to be 
surplusage,” and, therefore, the statute clearly violates PASPA.105  The 
result of Christie II’s was to leave sports wagering unlawful in New 
Jersey. 
On October 14, 2015, the Third Circuit vacated its opinion in 
Christie II, and granted an en banc hearing of the case.106  In August 
2016, the Third Circuit’s en banc decision once again held that the 2014 
Law violated PASPA because it authorized, by law, sports gambling, 
and that PASPA continues to remain constitutional.107  In this Third 
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Circuit decision, the Court focused heavily on the anti-commandeering 
doctrine, once again ruling that PASPA does not present states with a 
coercive binary choice or affirmative command.108  Therefore, it did 
not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.109 
On October 7, 2016, New Jersey petitioned for writ of certiorari 
to the Supreme Court, and as of the date of this comment, the petition 
is pending.110  Although PASPA does violate principles of federalism, 
sports wagering cannot remain illegal under PASPA, while fantasy 
sports continue to be legal.  Per sports-law expert Daniel Wallach, “the 
rise of daily fantasy sports . . . may pave the way for legalized sports 
gambling overall in the United States.”111  Wallach believes that 
Congress cannot have it both ways, and must either apply PASPA to 
daily fantasy sports, or repeal PASPA altogether.112 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Federalism Basis 
During the Constitutional Convention, federalism played an 
integral part in keeping the country bound to a common core of 
governance, while preserving the individual identity of the sovereign 
states.  During the times leading up to the creation of the United States 
Constitution, James Madison described federalism as, “the power 
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct 
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among 
distinct and separate departments . . . [t]he different governments will 
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by 
itself.”113  Alexander Hamilton agreed that “the system, though it may 
not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one.”114  The 
inclusion of federalism with two distinct governments was a substantial 
revision to the Articles of Confederation, and formed the basis for the 
United States Constitution. 
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Concepts of federalism are found throughout the Constitution, but 
three main areas apply to PASPA.  First, the Supremacy Clause 
establishes that the Constitution and federal laws and treaties made 
under the Constitution, “shall be the supreme law of the land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”115  Next, the Commerce 
Clause confers upon Congress an express provision to regulate 
interstate commerce “among the several States.”116  Finally, the Tenth 
Amendment expressly states that powers not delegated to the federal 
government are “reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”117  These provisions make the Constitution and federal law 
supreme over state law, but also gives states their own power to make 
their own laws where the federal government does not have authority. 
The Supreme Court has spoken on issues of federalism stemming 
from the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment numerous 
times.118  First, in South Carolina v. Baker, at issue was a federal statute 
that removed “the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on 
publicly offered long-term bonds unless the bonds were issued in 
registered form.”119  The Court held that the statue did not violate the 
Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism because: (1) the states 
must use the political process to protect themselves from congressional 
regulation, and South Carolina was not deprived from using the 
political process; and (2) the statute was a regulatory scheme and did 
not control or influence the manner in which states could regulate 
private parties, and the “commandeering” that occurs, in an inevitable 
consequence of the regulation.120 
Next, in New York v. United States, a federal statute was at issue 
regarding low-level radioactive waste by the states, and the statute 
included a take-title provision that forced states to “take title” to waste 
if it was not disposed of by a certain date.121  The statute was struck 
down because it unconstitutionally compelled the states to act or 
administer a federal regulatory program.122  The Court relied on 
principles of federalism throughout the opinion.123  First, the Court 
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explained that state residents have the ability to decide whether or not 
the state will comply with federal policy choices, and forcing states to 
regulate diminishes accountability on both the federal and state 
levels.124  Although Congress has powers to govern directly, the 
Constitution does not force states to directly govern according to 
Congress’s instructions.125  Congress does not have the power to simply 
“commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”126  
The Court also clarified that although the federal government can 
preempt state regulation contrary to federal interest and hold out 
incentives to states for not complying, the Constitution does not 
authorize “Congress simply to direct the States to provide for the 
disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders.”127  
New York ultimately held that Congress violated the Tenth Amendment 
when it directed the states to regulate in a particular way regarding 
radioactive waste.128 
Additionally, in Printz v. United States, at issue was a federal 
statute’s provisions that required the Attorney General to establish a 
national system for distributing firearms, and forced distributors to 
instantly perform background checks on possible gun owners.129  
Relying on the New York holding, the Court struck down the statue as 
unconstitutional because it compelled the states to enforce a federal 
regulatory program.130  The Court reasoned that “[t[he Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their 
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program.”131  In addition, it makes no difference whether policymaking 
is involved, and there is no need for a case-by-case analysis, because 
such commands are simply unconstitutional and violate dual 
sovereignty.132  In New York, the Court held that Congress cannot 
compel the states to act or enforce a regulatory program,133 and then in 
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Printz, the Court held that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition 
by recruiting state officers directly.134 
Finally, in Reno v. Condon, the Court was faced with a federal 
statute that regulated the disclosure of personal information contained 
in state motor vehicle department’s records, and restricted states’ 
ability to disclose a driver’s personal information without the driver’s 
consent.135 Similar to the statute at issue in Baker, the Court upheld the 
statute because it was consistent with the constitutional principles of 
federalism set forth in both New York and Printz, and did not require 
the states to enact any laws or regulations.136  The Court reasoned that 
the statute did not require the States to regulate their own citizens, and 
did not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of any federal 
statutes.137 
The Commerce Clause is yet another important federalism basis.  
The Supreme Court has established a legal framework to determine 
when Congress has the power to regulate under the provision.  The 
Commerce Clause gives Congress “considerabl[e] . . . latitude in 
regulating conduct and transactions.”138  Congress may regulate an 
activity that “substantially affects interstate commerce” if it “arise[s] 
out of or [is] connected with a commercial transaction.”139  Even where 
activities are purely intrastate, Congress can still regulate them if they 
substantially affect interstate commerce.140  Where an activity 
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it 
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it 
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, 
and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at 
some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or 
‘indirect.’141 
From the aforementioned analysis, it is clear that the Commerce 
Clause is a broad constitutional power that gives Congress much 
discretion in regulating commerce amongst the states. 
The Constitution itself, as well as the foregoing United States 
Supreme Court cases, have established the precedent that federal courts 
must rely on when dealing with federalism issues. New York and Printz 
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are the only two cases in which the Supreme Court has struck down 
statutes under the anti-commandeering doctrine, and NCAA marks the 
first time that the Third Circuit has heard such an issue.142 
B. Application to PASPA 
 PASPA violates the core principles of federalism that are 
enumerated in the Constitution and clarified by the Supreme Court.  
The three federalism issues involved in PASPA are: (1) whether 
Congress can regulate sports wagering under the Commerce Clause; 
(2) whether PASPA violates equal sovereignty of the States; and (3) 
whether PASPA commandeers the states.143 
First, Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”144  
Congress may regulate any economic activity that “substantially affects 
interstate commerce” if it “arise[s] out of or is connected with a 
commercial transaction.”145  There is little doubt that Congress can 
regulate sports wagering under the Commerce Clause.  Both sports and 
gambling (considered either separately or together) are economic 
activities, and they both substantially affect interstate commerce.146  
Additionally, PASPA does not unconstitutionally regulate purely local 
activities.147 
PASPA, however, does direct the states on how to act, rather than 
regulate interstate commerce.  Guided by federalism principles, 
“[s]tates are better positioned to craft state-specific solutions to local 
concerns, thereby serving as laboratories for novel policies.”148   The 
government that is closest to the people understands the specific details 
surrounding the circumstances, and thus is more responsive to those 
who are affected, rather than the more distant government.149  When 
drafting PASPA, Congress wanted to curtail the negative effects sports 
gambling would have on professional and amateur sports, as well as 
limit the negative effects of gambling in general.150  PASPA, however, 
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does not keep states, like New Jersey, which could use the economic 
increase from sports gambling, in mind.  New Jersey has a history of 
gambling and, currently, a strong reliance on gambling.  As such, New 
Jersey could use sports wagering to boost its economy.  Since each state 
knows best of whether it could benefit from something, like sports 
wagering, it should be an issue left to the states to decide.  For these 
reasons, sports wagering should be a locally-regulated activity and not 
congressionally banned. 
The problem with relying on Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power, is that PASPA is a reach of the power that goes too far.  The 
Commerce Clause only allows Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce directly, “it does not authorize Congress to regulate state 
governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”151  By enacting 
PASPA, Congress did exactly what the Court in New York said was 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.  PASPA is not a 
regulatory scheme, and while Congress could have regulated sports 
gambling directly under the Commerce Clause, it did not.152  Instead, 
“[Congress] chose to set federal parameters as to how states may 
regulate sports gambling.”153  There is “no case law that allows 
Congress to achieve federal policy objectives by dictating how states 
regulate sports gambling.”154  PASPA does not regulate state activities 
or interstate commerce, but rather, it seeks to control or influence how 
states regulate private parties, which is a distinction that the Supreme 
Court has recognized as significant in Baker, Reno, and New York.155 
Furthermore, an equal sovereignty issue arises, because PASPA 
grandfathered a few states into the statute, and thus does not ban sports 
wagering in those states.156  The equal sovereignty principle has been 
understood to apply to the Commerce Clause.157  The Constitution’s 
framers, as well as case law that follows, provided “evidence that the 
Commerce Clause did not allow regulations inconsistent with the equal 
sovereignty principle.”158  There has also been some evidence in the 
Supreme Court of this as well, especially through Justice Ginsburg’s 
recognition that statutes enacted under congressional powers other than 
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the Fifteenth Amendment, “most notably statutes enacted pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause, raise ‘equal sovereignty’ issues.”159 
By continuing to allow sports wagering in a few states, PASPA 
not only fails to achieve its main goal of keeping sports games 
legitimate, because there are still places available for people to go and 
bet on games, but also treats the states unfairly.  Therefore, PASPA’s 
ban on sports wagering in only some states is a violation of the equal 
sovereignty principle and too broad a use of the Commerce Clause.  
Applying the equal sovereignty principle to the Commerce Clause will 
“prevent ‘a few States in Congress [from] secur[ing] a monopoly of 
certain branches of trade and business to themselves, to the injury, if 
not to the destruction, of their less favored neighbors.’”160 Currently, 
since only a few states can implement sports wagering, those states 
hold a monopoly in the nation for legalized sports wagering.  If 
Congress wanted to regulate sports wagering for its negative effects, 
then it would either repeal PASPA and regulate how state gambling 
schemes are implemented, or it would prohibit all states from allowing 
sports wagering.  Until that point, PASPA stands as a violation to the 
equal sovereignty principle and is too far a reach of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power. 
Next, as illustrated in New York and Printz, the federal 
government cannot direct states to enact legislation, or “commandeer” 
the states, nor can it direct state officials to implement federal policy.161  
As laid out in New York, Congress does not have authority to directly 
require that the states do or not do something, and while the Commerce 
Clause power allows Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
directly, “it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ 
regulation of interstate commerce.”162  Additionally, in Printz, the 
Court held that Congress cannot compel state officers directly, nor can 
it “issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, 
nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”163 
As Justice Vanaskie explained in the dissent of Christie I, “[n]o legal 
principle exists for finding a distinction between the federal 
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government compelling state governments to exercise their sovereignty 
to enact or enforce laws on the one hand, and restricting state 
governments from exercising their sovereignty to enact or enforce laws 
on the other hand.”164  Guided by previous Supreme Court opinions, 
Congress may regulate the commercial activity themselves, provided 
states have a choice about whether to implement regulations consistent 
with federal standards, let federal regulation preempt state law, require 
states to consider federal regulations, or even encourage states to 
regulate in a particular way; but Congress cannot compel states to 
implement federal policy, or commandeer them.165 
Here, there is no doubt that PASPA “regulate[s] state 
governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”166  PASPA does this 
in a selective, uneven and random way, by only prohibiting sports 
wagering in forty-seven states, but still allowing it in a few.  PASPA 
prohibits some states from authorizing sports wagering and dictates the 
way states regulate interstate commerce, therefore, contravening 
principles of federalism.167  The Supreme Court “has been explicit” that 
“the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress 
the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ 
instructions,” and this is exactly what PASPA does.168 
Although New York and Printz both involved statutes in which 
Congress affirmatively forced the states to engage in an act, the 
principles set forth apply to cases where Congress prohibits certain 
conduct, like PASPA. As Judge Vanaskie pointed out, affirmative 
commands to engage in conduct can be rephrased as prohibitions 
against not engaging in that same conduct.169  Judge Vanaskie went on 
to explain how permitting negative commands to state governments 
will alter New York’s and Printz’s holdings that limited Congress’s 
power to compel states to adopt federal policy.170  Separating negative 
prohibitions from affirmative mandates nullifies important structural 
protections inherent in the concept of dual sovereignty.171 
Compelling the states to regulate or not to regulate takes away the 
political accountability that federalism sought to promote.  When the 
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federal government directs states to regulate, the state is usually blamed 
for the negative effects of the regulation, especially when the regulation 
is politically unpopular.172  When states are forced to adopt federal 
regulatory programs, Congress can take credit for solving problems 
without having to ask its constituents to pay for the solutions with 
higher federal taxes, and the states are put in the position of taking the 
blame for its burdensomeness and defects.173  New Jersey voters 
approved sports wagering and, therefore, it is easy for voters to blame 
the State for not having it implemented, while Congress is really at 
fault.  States can operate some forms of gambling, like lotteries and 
casinos, while others, like sports wagering, remain illegal because of 
policy choices that Congress chose to implement; therefore, creating 
accountability concerns undermining principles of federalism.174  
PASPA has done exactly that in prohibiting the states from 
implementing sports wagering, and leaving the states to bear the crux 
of public disapproval. 
Although the federal government cannot force the states to adopt 
policy, it does have the power to regulate the states through preemption, 
which makes state laws that conflict with federal laws invalid.175  If 
Congress identifies a problem that “falls within its realm of authority” 
then it may provide a solution directly or provide incentives for states 
to comply with the solution.176  It thus follows that a state law contrary 
to a federal regulatory or deregulatory scheme is void under the 
Supremacy Clause and principles of preemption.177 
PASPA, however, does not operate under a regulatory or 
deregulatory scheme.  PASPA does not tell the states how to regulate 
sports wagering, but rather completely prohibits states from 
“sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], promot[ing], licens[ing], or 
authoriz[ing]” gambling on sports.178  Also, it is not a deregulatory 
measure, as its purpose was to “stem the spread of state-sponsored 
sports gambling, not let it go unregulated.”179  The majority opinion in 
Christie I does not cite to any case that sustained a “federal statute that 
purported to regulate the states under the Commerce Clause where 
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there was no underlying federal scheme of regulation or 
deregulation.”180  Therefore, “PASPA stands alone in telling the states 
that they may not regulate an aspect of interstate commerce that 
Congress believes should be prohibited.”181  PASPA is unconstitutional 
because its prohibition of state-authorized sports gambling does not 
emanate from a federal regulatory scheme that expressly or implicitly 
preempts state regulation that would conflict with federal policy, but 
instead attempts to implement federal policy by telling the states that 
they may not regulate an otherwise unregulated activity.182 
Finally, although the Third Circuit has heard challenges on 
PASPA before, the Circuit is not bound by stare decisis to rule PASPA 
constitutional based on federalism grounds.183  In Office of the 
Commissioner of Baseball, the Third Circuit dealt with the question of 
which sovereign had the authority, under either the “usual” or “altered” 
constitutional balance, to regulate sports gambling, and held that 
Congress has the authority to regulate sports gambling when it does so 
itself.184  In this case, however, the Third Circuit was faced with the 
issue of whether Congress has the authority to regulate how states 
regulate sports gambling.185 
PASPA violates core concepts of federalism, and 
unconstitutionally regulates the states in their regulation of sports 
gambling.  PASPA violates principles of federalism articulated by the 
Supreme Court, especially those principles explained in New York and 
Printz.186 
C. Impact on New Jersey 
New Jersey is stuck in the middle of this intra circuit conflict 
about whether PASPA is unconstitutional.187  Christie II changed what 
Christie I said was wrong about the New Jersey Sports Wagering Law, 
but the analysis and holdings of both cases undermine the Constitution 
and the Supreme Court.188 
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Additionally, New Jersey voters, who approved sports wagering 
in the state, are suffering.  The voters are frustrated that what they 
approved has not been implemented. Additionally, Monmouth Park 
Racetrack and other racetracks in New Jersey, which badly need sports 
wagering to survive, cannot yet accept wagers, and as casinos continue 
to close, Atlantic City needs an economic boost that sports wagering 
can bring.189  Sports gambling can bring New Jersey’s economy exactly 
what it needs.  There are multiple ways in which sports wagering can 
increase state revenue including: recapturing money lost to illegal 
gambling; collecting taxes and fees from private casinos; encouraging 
people to get out to casinos and racetracks where they will spend more 
money on gambling, restaurants, and entertainment; and increasing 
traffic in casinos and racetracks, which can lead to increased 
employment.190  Sports gambling is a multi-billion dollar business, and 
by making it legal, it could get even bigger and have a positive impact 
on economies. 
Look to Nevada, a state grandfathered into PASPA, for example. 
There, legal sports wagering brings 30 million visitors to Nevada each 
year and provides employment for thousands of people.191  That 
equates to millions of people spending millions of dollars each year on 
hotels, amenities, restaurants, and entertainment.  New Jersey is 
currently not able to experience this boom in economic growth because 
sports wagering is illegal, so people stay home and bet on unregulated, 
black market games, instead of visiting the State’s casinos and 
racetracks where they would spend more money than just that spent on 
wagers. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
PASPA should be ruled unconstitutional as it is too broad an 
implementation of the Commerce Clause, violates the Tenth 
Amendment and equal protection of the states, and commandeers the 
states.  The desire for a separation of state and federal governments 
played an integral part in the Constitution’s creation.  Social issues, like 
sports wagering, should be left up to the states, as each state is more in-
tuned to its citizens’ wants and needs than the federal government.  
Additionally, PASPA bars states, like New Jersey, from the 
opportunity to regulate and tax a lucrative activity that is currently 
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occurring mostly underground.  PASPA cites worries about 
maintaining sports’ integrities as a reason for its existence, yet fantasy 
sports, which create the same, and if not more worries, are still legal.  
As a result, New Jersey, which desperately could use sports wagering 
to improve its economy, is not able to implement this type of gambling 
into its casinos and racetracks, even though the voters have already 
approved it. 
In a song about Atlantic City, New Jersey’s own rock laureate, 
Bruce Springsteen, may have predicted the City’s fate, singing, 
“[e]verything dies baby that’s a fact, but maybe everything that dies 
someday comes back.”192  Although Atlantic City may be going 
through financial and social difficulties, if PASPA is ruled 
unconstitutional for violating principles of federalism, then legal sports 
wagering can give Atlantic City, and the rest of New Jersey, the 
economic boom that it desperately needs in order revive its gambling-
fueled economy. 
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